DroidNative: Automating and optimizing detection of Android native code malware variants

dc.contributor.authorAlam, Shahid
dc.contributor.authorQu, Zhengyang
dc.contributor.authorRiley, Ryan
dc.contributor.authorChen, Yan
dc.contributor.authorRastogi, Vaibhav
dc.date.accessioned2025-10-29T11:29:30Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.departmentFakülteler, Mühendislik Fakültesi, Bilgisayar Mühendisliği Bölümü
dc.description.abstractAccording to the Symantec and F-Secure threat reports, mobile malware development in 2013 and 2014 has continued to focus almost exclusively (similar to 99%) on the Android platform. Malware writers are applying stealthy mutations (obfuscations) to create malware variants, thwarting detection by signature-based detectors. In addition, the plethora of more sophisticated detectors making use of static analysis techniques to detect such variants operate only at the bytecode level, meaning that malware embedded in native code goes undetected. A recent study shows that 86% of the most popular Android applications contain native code, making native code malware a plausible threat vector. This paper proposes DroidNative, an Android malware detector that uses specific control flow patterns to reduce the effect of obfuscations and provides automation. As far as we know, DroidNative is the first system that builds cross-platform (x86 and ARM) semantic-based signatures at the Android native code level, allowing the system to detect malware embedded in either bytecode or native code. When tested with a dataset of 5490 samples, DroidNative achieves a detection rate (DR) of 93.57% and a false positive rate of 2.7%. When tested with traditional malware variants, it achieves a DR of 99.48%, compared to the DRs of academic and commercial tools that range from 8.33% to 93.22%. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
dc.description.sponsorshipNPRP from the Qatar National Research Fund [6-1014-2-414]
dc.description.sponsorshipThis paper was made possible by NPRP grant 6-1014-2-414 from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation). The statements made herein are solely the responsibility of the authors.
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.cose.2016.11.011
dc.identifier.endpage246
dc.identifier.issn0167-4048
dc.identifier.issn1872-6208
dc.identifier.orcid0000-0002-4080-8042
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85002601088
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ1
dc.identifier.startpage230
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2016.11.011
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14854/11139
dc.identifier.volume65
dc.identifier.wosWOS:000395225000016
dc.identifier.wosqualityQ2
dc.indekslendigikaynakWeb of Science
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopus
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherElsevier Advanced Technology
dc.relation.ispartofComputers & Security
dc.relation.publicationcategoryMakale - Uluslararası Hakemli Dergi - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.snmzKA_WOS_20251020
dc.subjectAndroid native code
dc.subjectMaiware analysis
dc.subjectMaiware variant detection
dc.subjectControl flow analysis
dc.subjectData mining
dc.titleDroidNative: Automating and optimizing detection of Android native code malware variants
dc.typeArticle

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