Audit Committee Financial Expertise, Tenure, and Capital Structure Decisions, Evidence from Turkey

dc.contributor.authorÖzer, Gökhan
dc.contributor.authorMerter, Abdullah Kürşat
dc.date.accessioned2025-10-29T12:07:39Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.departmentFakülteler, İşletme Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü
dc.description6th International Conference on Banking and Finance Perspectives, ICBFP 2022 -- Cuenca -- 291359
dc.description.abstractCapital structure theory proposes that a company's capital structure is affected by a variety of factors. The most important of these factors is corporate governance practices. The audit committee is recognized as an important corporate governance mechanism that stands out with its monitoring and oversight responsibility. The audit committee helps to make financial decisions more soundly by providing coordination between a company's independent audit, internal audit, and the board of directors. In addition, firms ensure, through the audit committee, that managers' decisions to improve firm performance are ethically monitored. Previous studies have so far given little weight to the relationship between the audit committee and capital structures. Therefore, this study examines the impact of audit committee characteristics on the capital structure, with a particular focus on the financial expertise and tenure of audit committee members. The sample of the study includes mostly hand-collected 1,638 firm-year observations obtained from Turkey’s listed non-financial companies between 2009 and 2019. Empirical results indicate that the financial expertise and long tenure of the audit committee members are associated with lower financial leverage. Moreover, the presence of less tenure and nonfinancial experts members in the audit committee is associated with higher financial leverage. This study fills a literature gap where empirical evidence on how the audit committee affects capital structure is insufficient. © 2023 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-031-23416-3_5
dc.identifier.endpage66
dc.identifier.isbn9783031900532
dc.identifier.isbn9789819665259
dc.identifier.isbn9783319338637
dc.identifier.isbn9783031766572
dc.identifier.isbn9783030552763
dc.identifier.isbn9783030305482
dc.identifier.isbn9783031065804
dc.identifier.isbn9783031261206
dc.identifier.isbn9783030506759
dc.identifier.isbn9789811678172
dc.identifier.issn2198-7254
dc.identifier.issn2198-7246
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85151077021
dc.identifier.scopusqualityQ4
dc.identifier.startpage55
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23416-3_5
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14854/14055
dc.indekslendigikaynakScopus
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer Nature
dc.relation.ispartofSpringer Proceedings in Business and Economics
dc.relation.publicationcategoryKonferans Öğesi - Uluslararası - Kurum Öğretim Elemanı
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/closedAccess
dc.snmzKA_Scopus_20251020
dc.subjectCapital Structure, Leverage, Audit Committee, Financial Expertise, Tenure
dc.titleAudit Committee Financial Expertise, Tenure, and Capital Structure Decisions, Evidence from Turkey
dc.typeConference Object

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